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Comment
Impeachment Through Introduction of Prior
Criminal Record - The Pennsylvania Rule v.
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)
Prosecution and defense attorneys have long been aware that
impeachment of the opponent's key witness can be an effective trial
tactic.' If the fact finder doubts the witness' credibility, much of
the value of his testimony is negated. Introducing evidence of a wit-
ness' prior conviction, to the extent it aids in the credibility deter-
mination, is a permissible impeachment technique.' The conse-
quences of this practice, however, may exceed its limited purpose.
It can unnecessarily damage the reputation of a witness whose prior
crimes have no bearing on the trustworthiness of his testimony.'
Moreover, where the witness is a defendant in a criminal trial, intro-
duction of his criminal record may lead a jury to convict him on the
basis of his record rather than examine the evidence presented at
trial.4 The potential for prejudice is overwhelming.
Deciding when such evidence is admissible and what type of
crimes may be introduced is therefore a delicate evidentiary prob-
lem. Both state and federal courts have struggled to formulate rules
of admissibility which will reflect an appreciation for both the pro-
bative value and prejudicial effect of the criminal record sought to
be introduced.5 The federal and Pennsylvania rules contain several
differences which are of particular importance to criminal defense
counsel. This comment will explore those differences as well as the
background and scope of both rules.
For a discussion of the advantages of impeachment, see Hearings on Proposed Rules
of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 68-69 (1973) (statement of Rep. Dennis).
2. See MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 43 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
3. For a discussion of the potential prejudice that can result from introduction of a prior
crime, see Note, To Take the Stand or Not to Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant
with a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 215 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Dilemma].
4. Cf. Commonwealth v. Scoggins, 466 Pa. 355, 353 A.2d 392 (1976) (prior crime can only
be introduced for impeachment purposes and not as substantial evidence of guilt).
5. See notes 23-62 and accompanying text infra.
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF IMPEACHMENT THROUGH USE OF PRIOR
CONVICTIONS
At common law, the admissibility problem confronting courts
today was often never presented; conviction for certain crimes -
treason, felonies or misdemeanors in the nature of crimen falsil -
rendered a person incompetent to testify.7 This disqualification,
which began in seventeenth century England and was subsequently
adopted in the United States,8 was originally based on the social
mores of England:' a criminal was not permitted to freely associate
with people who had not been convicted of a crime.10 Disqualifica-
tion from serving in court was part of the price one paid for breaking
the law."
Despite the persistence of English mores, the judiciary soon real-
ized that disqualifying an otherwise competent witness punished
the party who relied on the convict's testimony rather than the
offender. 2 As legal writers began to question the justification for this
rule, a more plausible rationale for disqualification was offered. In
its search for the truth, a court should not rely on a witness who has
broken the law; a person of such moral character was more likely to
lie on the witness stand." This moral turpitude theory persuaded
6. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 334 Pa. 321, 323, 5 A.2d 804, 805 (1939) (crimen falsi
involves the element of falsehood and includes forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury, sup-
pression of testimony by bribery or conspiracy to produce the absence of a witness, barratry,
and the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing to the prejudice of another man's right).
7. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mueller, 153 Pa. Super. Ct. 524, 527, 34 A.2d 321, 323
(1943) (term crimen falsi applied at common law to crimes which disqualified a person as a
witness). See generally 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 519, at 608 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited
as WIGMORE].
8. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 519 at 608-09.
9. Id. at 608.
10. Id. See also Browne v. Crashaw, 2 Bulstr. 154 (1613) (two convicted felons rejected as
witnesses by the court because the court believed that a felon was not fit to serve on a jury
nor act as a disinterested witness).
11. WIGMGRE, supra note 7, § 519 at 609.
12. Id.
13. Chief Justice Gilbert wrote:
Every plain and honest man offering the truth of any matter under the sanction and
solemnity of an oath is entitled to faith and credit . . . but where a man is convicted
of falsehood and other crimes against the common principles of honesty and humanity,
his oath is of no weight, because he hath not the credit of a witness. . . and he is rather
to be intended as a man profligate and abandoned than one under the sentiments and
convictions of those principles that teach probity and veracity.
GILBERT, EVIDENCE 139 (1727). See also Swivr, EVIDENCE 52 (1810), where the author states:
"[Plersons convicted of crimes evincive of a want of regard for those moral and religious
principles that constitute the obligation of an oath are excluded from testifying."
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courts to ban witnesses with criminal records, until it was attacked
by Jeremy Bentham in 1827." Bentham, whose writings are respon-
sible for the disappearance of disqualification, believed the rules of
evidence should be flexible enough to vary the treatment given to
potential witnesses with criminal records. 5 Different grades of
crimes called for variations in punishment; only those who had com-
mitted serious crimes should be disqualified. Furthermore, Ben-
tham exposed the illogic of barring criminals from testifying on the
basis of one conviction since one transgression did not necessarily
prove a lack of credibility.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the states were statuto-
rily abolishing disqualification and allowing evidence of prior con-
victions to be admitted on the question of the witness' credibility.,7
Just as the scope of disqualifying crimes had been uncertain at
common law, so was the definition of crimes that would be admissi-
ble for purposes of impeachment." But the state courts faced a more
important policy issue. The conflict between the need for relevant
evidence and the need to safeguard the witness from the likely
prejudicial effect of his prior guilt, 9 present when any witness was
impeached, became even more acute when the witness was a crimi-
nal defendant.'" The danger of prejudice in such cases could con-
ceivably raise issues of constitutional dimension. The prejudicial
effect of the prior conviction evidence might violate the sixth
amendment right to a fair trial or constitute a deprivation of due
process. Moreover, since the defendant was forced to choose
between the right to testify and his privilege against self-
incrimination, he could assert that his fifth amendment rights were
being violated.2' While constitutional attacks on the admission of
14. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 519 at 610.
15. See J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDicIAL EVIDENCE 406 (Bowring's ed. 1827) quoted in
WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 519 at 610.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., the Pennsylvania legislation discussed at note 23 infra.
18. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2. Several states, however, have codified their rules of
impeachment. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 434 (1960) (only crimes involving moral turpitude
are admissible to impeach); CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1966)(any felony can be used to
impeach the credibility of a witness); 1909 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 88, § 2444 (repealed 1967) (permit-
ted introduction of any crime for impeachment).
19. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 41.
20. See, e.g., Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Commonwealth v.
Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d 255 (1973).
21. See Note, The Dilemma of a Defendant Witness in New York: The Impeachment
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prior convictions for impeachment have not been successful," they
highlight the need for a just and rational approach to this balancing
problem.
II. THE PENNSYLVANIA IMPEACHMENT RULE
A. History of the Rule
In 1885, the Pennsylvania legislature declared criminals compe-
tent to testify.2 3 The Pennsylvania courts then held that the crimi-
nal, like any other witness, automatically placed his credibility at
issue and subjected himself to impeachment by taking the stand.,'
A criminal's prior record was admissible for purposes of assessing
credibility just as testimony of prior reputation for veracity was
admissible.2 5 In abrogating the disqualification rule, however, the
Pennsylvania legislature failed to limit the scope of crimes admissi-
ble for impeachment. In Commonwealth v. Varano,7 the court
Problem Half Solved, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. RaV. 129, 137-40 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Dilemma
of a Defendant].
22. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 562, 307 A.2d 255, 262 (1973). See
also Dilemma of a Defendant, supra note 21, at 139.
23. See 1885 Pa. Laws No. 26 (defendant with a criminal record has the right to testify
on his own behalf); 1887 Pa. Laws No. 89 (removing disability from all potential witnesses
who had been convicted of a crime).
24. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dorst, 285 Pa. 232, 132 A. 168 (1926) (prosecutor properly
introduced defendant's prior convictions in a prosecution for murder, since the defendant
asserted his credibility by offering himself as a witness). See also Commonwealth v. Doe, 79
Pa. Super. Ct. 162 (1922) (when defendant takes stand, the prosecution may introduce prior
convictions to enable jurors to properly assess his credibility).
25. See Commonwealth v. Butler, 405 Pa. 36, 173 A.2d 468, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 945
(1961).
26. The statutes abolishing common law disqualification did not limit the scope of admis-
sible crimes. See note 23 supra. Shortly after the turn of the century, the legislature passed
the Act of March 15, 1911, P.L. 20, § 1, which provided:
Hereafter any person charged with any crime, and called as a witness in his own behalf,
shall not be asked, and, if asked, shall not be required to answer, any question tending
to show that he has committed, or been charged with, or been convicted of any offense
other than the one wherewith he shall then be charged, or tending to show that he has
been of bad character or reputation; unless, [he attempts to establish his good reputa-
tion or testifies against a co-defendant].
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (Purdon 1964).
While this statute expressly prohibits a defendant in a criminal case from being cross-
examined as to other crimes he may have committed, case law clearly establishes that the
commonwealth can introduce, in rebuttal, evidence of prior convictions to attack the credibil-
ity of the defendant who has elected to testify in his own behalf. See Commonwealth v.
Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 563, 307 A.2d 255, 260 (1973). The statute is designed to prevent the
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held that a witness could only be questioned about convictions for
offenses which affected his credibility. The decision, however, gave
the trial court unfettered discretion to decide which crimes fell
within this category. Thus, the rule proved to be an ineffective
control on impeachment by prior conviction because each court
applied different standards. 8
Despite this shortcoming, the Pennsylvania law of impeachment
remained unchanged for nearly thirty years. 9 In the 1955 decision
of Keough v. Republic Fuel & Burner Co.,3 the court reiterated its
holding that introducing a witness' criminal record was discretion-
ary rather than a matter of right, but suggested new guidelines for
exercising the discretion. Under Keough, the trial court was to de-
termine whether evidence of a witness' prior conviction would con-
fuse the jury by unduly attracting its attention away from the pri-
mary issues at trial. If so, the evidence was to be excluded. Although
stated in clouded terms, the Keough rule improved the existing law
by focusing attention on the relative probative value of the evidence
sought to be introduced.
Aside from this change, the basic test in Pennsylvania - that
only felonies or misdemeanors involving crimen falsi were admissi-
ble - was not altered throughout the 1950's and 1960's.11 In 1965,
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia decided Luck v. United States.2 In construing a provision
of the D.C. Code, the court held that a conviction was admissible
prosecution from introducing evidence of other criminal acts of the accused for the purpose
of showing a probability that he committed the crime for which he is on trial because he is a
man of criminal character. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 190.
27. 258 Pa. 442, 102 A. 131 (1917) (the proper scope of admissible crimes held to encom-
pass only those which directly bear on credibility, i.e., felonies and misdemeanors in the
nature of crimen falsi).
28. See Commonwealth v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264, 145 A. 89 (1928) (the trial judge has
large discretion in determining which crimes affect credibility).
29. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kostan, 349 Pa. 560, 37 A.2d 606 (1944) (felonies or
misdemeanors in the nature of crimen falsi are admissible to impeach); Commonwealth v.
Yeager, 329 Pa. 81, 196 A. 827 (1938) (felonies or misdemeanors involving crimen falsi are
admissible).
30. 382 Pa. 593, 116 A.2d 671 (1955).
31. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 432 Pa. 571, 248 A.2d 295 (1968) (trial court
admitted prior conviction for armed robbery because it fell into the category of a felony or a
misdemeanor in the nature of crimen falsi); Commonwealth v. Butler, 405 Pa. 36, 173 A.2d
468 (witness can be impeached through evidence of felonies or misdemeanors involving
crimen falsi), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 945 (1961).
32. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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for impeachment unless the trial judge decided that the potential
prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value
regarding credibility. Although the decision had no constitutional
impact, its lucid approach to the problems of introducing a witness-
defendant's criminal record caused most state courts to reexamine
their standards of admissibility for impeachment.
B. The Current Status of the Pennsylvania Rule
In 1973, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted the Luck
rule in Commonwealth v. Bighum 31 and began what was to become
a radical change in the commonwealth's rules of impeachment by
prior conviction. The Bighum decision clarified the broad test laid
down in Varano as to which offenses related to credibility. A defen-
dant who took the stand could be impeached by evidence of a prior
conviction only if the crime involved dishonesty or false statement.34
Then, incorporating the Luck decision, the Bighum court held that
once the trial judge decided the conviction was within this category
of potentially admissible crimes, he was required to weigh its proba-
tive value against its prejudicial effect before admitting it as evi-
dence .3
In effect, the court determined that convictions for crimes not
involving dishonesty or false statement have little probative value
in assessing credibility. Since the function of the jury is to decide if
a witness is accurately testifying, the jurors should be apprised of
any crimes in the witness' past that might indicate a willingness to
testify falsely. But to be admitted, these crimes must bear directly
on the defendant's veracity.3 6 Only crimes involving deceit indicate
the perpetrator's willingness to disregard the truth. 7 Bighum, how-
33. 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d 255 (1973) (adopting the Luck rule).
34. Id. at 566, 307 A.2d at 262. The potential prejudice is greatest when the defendant
takes the stand. The average juror tends to hear evidence of the defendant's prior convictions
and decides that he is a criminal and therefore guilty of the crime with which he is charged.
See text accompanying notes 35-38 infra.
35. 452 Pa. at 556, 307 A.2d at 262-63.
36. See Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d 255 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Bryant, 372 A.2d 880 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (court should admit only those crimes involving
dishonesty or false statement); Commonwealth v. Moore, 369 A.2d 862 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977)
(convictions outside the category of dishonesty or false statement have no probative value in
regard to credibility).
37. See Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d 255 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Moore, 369 A.2d 862 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
Vol. 16: 73
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ever, was controlling only where a defendant had taken the stand;
the admissibility of prior crimes with respect to impeachment of
other witnesses was unclear. Then, in Commonwealth v. Kahley,3 8
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court extended the Bighum rule to all
witnesses. Thus, Kahley and Bighum, read together with Luck, first
limit crimes admissible in Pennsylvania to those involving false-
hood or deceit and then require a trial judge to weigh'the probative
value of the particular crime against its capacity for prejudice.
The first stage of this dual consideration, determining admissibil-
ity on the basis of the type of crime committed, is the easier to
resolve. Acts of deceit, fraud, or cheating clearly meet the threshold
test of admissibility because they indicate a witness' inclination
toward dishonesty.39 Burglary, 0 larceny,4 receiving stolen goods, 12
forgery,43 auto theft," passing forged currency,45 and arson 4  have
also been held to pass the initial test established in Bighum and
Kahley. Crimes of violence and certain non-violent offenses, on the
other hand, often indicate very little about the credibility of those
who commit them and as a result are usually summarily excluded.
Included in this category have been crimes such as rape, juvenile
adjudications for shoplifting and underage drinking, 48 pandering,4
38. 467 Pa. 272, 356 A.2d 745 (1976) (regardless of who takes the stand, only crimes
involving false statement or dishonesty are admissible), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1044 (1977).
39. See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1029 (1968). The Gordon decision, elaborating upon Luck, set out a rule of thumb: convictions
for crimes involving dishonesty should be admitted because they bear on veracity whereas
crimes of violence should not be admitted because they do not indicate a mendacious nature.
Id. at 940.
40. See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 372 A.2d 880 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (burglary admitted
as involving dishonesty); Commonwealth v. Flores, 371 A.2d 1366 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977)
(burglary admissible because it involves dishonesty).
41. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 361 A.2d 862 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (larceny admissible
because it involves moral turpitude and reflects dishonesty).
42. See Commonwealth v. King, 455 Pa. 363, 316 A.2d 878 (1974) (receiving stolen goods
involves dishonesty).
43. See Commonwealth v. Pilosky, 362 A.2d 253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (forgery involves
dishonesty).
44. See Commonwealth v. Rainey, 363 A.2d 1148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (whether auto
theft should be excluded is at least questionable).
45. See Commonwealth v. King, 455 Pa. 363, 316 A.2d 878 (1974) (uttering admissible aa
involving dishonesty).
46. See Commonwealth v. Haines, 36 LEH. L.J. 179 (Pa. C.P. 1975) (arson is a crime
involving dishonesty and a conviction thereof is relevant to attack credibility).
47. See Commonwealth v. Moore, 369 A.2d 862 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (rape does not
involve dishonesty and therefore is not admissible to impeach).
48. See Commonwealth v. Katchmer, 453 Pa. 461, 309 A.2d 591 (1973) (juvenile adjudica-
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failure to observe medical ethics,5" operating an illegal tavern,5 as-
sault on a spouse, 2 reckless driving,53 fornication,54 and voluntary
manslaughter.55
Once the trial judge has decided that the crime is of a type involv-
ing dishonesty or false statement, he must then apply the Luck
considerations. This balancing approach was designed to exclude
evidence of crimes which, because of the circumstances surrounding
their commission, are either too prejudicial or of too little probative
value to warrant admission. The remoteness of the conviction, the
age and circumstances of the witness, and the witness' behavior
since he committed the crime are prime considerations. For exam-
ple, a remote conviction will be excluded as not bearing on the
witness' credibility at the time of the trial. Similarly, a conviction
for a crime committed while the witness was a juvenile may be
excluded. The court must also consider the effect a particular wit-
ness' credibility will have on the outcome of the case. 7 When a
witness' credibility may be determinative of the issues, the trial
judge should be considerably more lenient in admitting the prior
tions do not rise to the level of convictions and are not admissible).
49. See.McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Rys., 432 Pa. 123, 247 A.2d 467 (1968) (pandering convic-
tion has no bearing on veracity).
50. See Downey v. Weston, 451 Pa. 259, 301 A.2d 635 (1973) (physician who failed to
observe medical ethics on one occasion was no less likely to be a credible witness).
51. See Commonwealth v. Gates, 392 Pa. 557, 141 A.2d 219 (1958) (testimony that witness
operated a "speakeasy" and quarrelled with her husband not admissible to impeach).
52. Id.
53. See Gregg v. Fisher, 377 Pa. 445, 105 A.2d 105 (1954) (improper to attempt to impeach
witness through use of conviction for reckless driving).
54. See Commonwealth v. Allen, 220 Pa. Super. Ct. 403, 289 A.2d 476 (1972) (fornication
not a crime involving crimen falsi and therefore cannot be used to attack credibility). Fornica-
tion is no longer a crime in Pennsylvania. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101-27 (Purdon
1973).
55. See Commonwealth v. Butcher, 22 Ches. Co. Rep. 33 (Pa. C.P. 1973) (voluntary
manslaughter is a crime of passion and does not involve dishonesty).
56. See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (explaining the Luck
criteria), cert., denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968); Commonwealth v. Moore, 369 A.2d 862 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1977) (court considered all factors in the Bighum-Luck rule); Commonwealth v.
Rainey, 363 A.2d 1148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (prior crimes were admissible because they
involved dishonesty and were not too remote); Commonwealth v. Smith, 240 Pa. Super. Ct.
212, 361 A.2d 862 (1976) (prior crimes admitted because they involved dishonesty and took
place a relatively short time prior to trial).
57. Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also Gordon v. United
States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968); Commonwealth v.
Moore, 369 A.2d 862 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (trial court must apply Luck factors).
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crime evidence."8 When the witness to be impeached is the defen-
dant, the most critical consideration is whether it is more important
for the jury to hear the defendant's story than to know of the prior
conviction.59 The trial court must consider what impact the witness'
testimony is likely to have upon the ultimate determination of the
issues at trial 0 If, for example, the defendant is the only defense
witness and he could aid his cause by testifying, he may, neverthe-
less, choose not to take the stand for fear of the prejudice that may
result if prior crimes are introduced. The trial judge should then rule
at a pre-trial conference that the defendant's prior crimes will be
excluded, thus permitting the jury to hear what may be the only
first-hand account of the alleged incident. The similarity between
the prior conviction and the crime with which the witness-defendant
is charged will also influence this decision. In Bighum and Kahley,
the court recognized that where multiple convictions for the same
crime can be found, the prosecutor may introduce the crimes under
a pretext of impeachment. The jury, however, may well use the
evidence as proof of the defendant's predisposition to commit the
crime and convict him on that basis .6
The Pennsylvania rule is designed to allow counsel to discredit a
witness without smearing his character. The limitations theoreti-
cally focus on credibility and minimize prejudice. While the rule
seems to be the correct combination of fairness and flexibility, its
actual application becomes more complicated because of the inher-
ent vagueness of the Luck criteria. The specific problems of the
Pennsylvania rule will be discussed in Part IV.6"
III. FEDERAL RULE 609(a)
A. The Influence of Luck v. United States6 3
In Luck, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals vested the
58. See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1029 (1968).
59. See Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 567, 307 A.2d 255, 263 (1973).
60. See Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also Gordon v. United
States, 389 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968); Commonwealth v.
Moore, 369 A.2d 862 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (trial court must apply Luck factors).
61. The threat of a conviction based on a prior criminal record often forces defense counsel
to advise his client not to take the stand even though the defendant's testimony would be
important.
62. See notes 136-46 and accompanying text infra.
63. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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trial judge with discretion to determine the admissibility of a prior
conviction for impeachment purposes." Before the trial judge could
exclude evidence of a prior conviction, he had to find the potential
for prejudice against the witness far outweighed the probative value
of the evidence. 5 The intended fairness of the rule was in its flexibil-
ity; each case was to be judged on its own merits rather than on a
fixed standard.
From 1965, the date of the Luck decision, until 1975, the effective
date of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 7 the majority of the circuits
either directly cited Luck as controlling or followed a similar rule.
The First," Third, 9 Fourth,7" and Seventh" circuits cited Luck or
United States v. Gordon,72 a District of Columbia Court of Appeals
decision elaborating the Luck holding. The Second,73 Eighth,74 and
64. 348 F.2d at 768-69.
65. For an explanation of the burden of proof, see Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968). Under the Luck rule, the defendant had
the burden of proving to the courts in a pretrial conference that the evidence should not be
introduced against him. He was forced to show that the prejudicial effect of the conviction
was much greater than its value to the jury in assessing his credibility. Unless he met that
burden, the conviction was admissible. Id. at 939-40.
66. Id. The factors to be considered by the trial judge include: the nature of the crime,
the time of conviction, the similarity of the crimes, the importance of the defendant's testi-
mony, and the degree to which the witness' credibility will influence the outcome of the trial.
Id. See notes 33-62 and accompanying text supra for an explanation of the Luck criteria as
adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307
A.2d 255 (1973).
67. The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective July 1, 1975.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 412 F.2d 753, 756 (1st Cir. 1969) (court cited Luck
in holding that prior conviction can only be considered in regard to credibility), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 944 (1970).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Greenberg, 419 F.2d 808, 809 (3d Cir. 1969) (court cited
Gordon in holding that district court has broad discretion in excluding prior crimes).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Hildreth, 387 F.2d 328, 329 (4th Cir. 1967) (court cited
Gordon in holding that judge can limit cross-examination, if prejudice will result).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Morefield, 411 F.2d 1186, 1188 (7th Cir.) (court cited
Gordon in allowing judges full discretion to admit prior crimes), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 916
(1969). But see United States v. DiVarco, 484 F.2d 670, 677 (7th Cir.) (test is simply whether
trial judge believes prejudice outweighs the probative value), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916
(1973).
72. 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270, 273 (2d Cir.) (trial judge may
exclude prior conviction if he finds that it negates credibility only slightly but creates sub-
stantial prejudice, taking into account such factors as nature of conviction, its bearing on
veracity, age of the witness at the time of commission and the evidence's probable impact
on the minds of jurors), cert: denied, 394 U.S. 947 (1968).
74. See, e.g., Sears v. United States, 490 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir.) (court applied Palumbo),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 949 (1974).
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Tenth" circuits followed a rule similar to Luck without citing the
decision. Only the Fifth"5 and Ninth" circuits operated on a wholly
different rule. This widespread influence of the Luck decision was
one factor that led to the promulgation of Rule 609(a) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Congress was determined to eradicate the Luck
doctrine from the federal system. Although intended as an improve-
ment over the rigid standard which had preceded it, the decision
failed to provide trial judges with meaningful criteria that would
enable them to evaluate the evidentiary worth of a prior conviction.
Congress believed the Luck rule allowed too much discretion and
encouraged inconsistent decisions."
B. Legislative History of Rule 609(a)
While case law is presently sparse, legislative history does much
to explain the rule and to demonstrate the countervailing considera-
tions and pressures that led to the final draft. As enacted, rule
609(a) is a compromise between the drafts written by members of
the House of Representatives and the Senate and the draft adopted
by the Supreme Court of the United States.
For thirteen years prior to the rule's passage,7" the drafts proposed
by Congress had undergone substantial revision with each session;
the heated debates in both houses indicated that revising the exist-
ing judicial doctrine was not to be an easy process.80
75. See, e.g., Butler v. United States, 408 F.2d 1103, 1104 (10th Cir. 1969) (citing
Palumbo).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Gloria, 494 F.2d 477, 481 (5th Cir.) (felonies and misde-
meanors involving moral turpitude held admissible for impeachment), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
995 (1974).
77. See, e.g., Burg v. United States, 406 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1969) (three-judge panel
discussed admissibility of prior convictions: one judge accepted Luck (Madden, J.), one
favored admitting felonies and misdemeanors involving crimen falsi (Ely, J., concurring), and
the other urged that the court en banc examine the question (Hamley, J., concurring).
78. See Statements On Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions: Hearings on S. 2432 Before
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 29894 (1971).
79. In 1961, the Judicial Conference of the United States authorized Chief Justice Warren
to appoint a committee to study the advisability of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
committee reported to the Judicial Conference Standing Committee later that year; it recom-
mended that the Federal Rules of Evidence be promulgated. See 46 F.R.D. 161, 171 (1969).
80. The debates over rule 609(a) were among the longest and most heated of any debates
dealing with the Federal Rules of Evidence. See United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 360
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (discussing legislative history of rule 609(a)); United States v. Jackson, 405
F. Supp. 938, 940 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (discussing legislative history).
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The initial draft of rule 609(a) was written in 1965 by the Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Evidence and was a simple restatement
of the common law federal rule."' Itallowed evidence of prior convic-
tions to be introduced for purposes of impeachment if the crime was
a felony or a misdemeanor involving dishonesty or false statement.8
In electing this approach, the Advisory Committee rejected several
alternatives all of which it found to be unacceptable: (1) prohibiting
impeachment by prior convictions when the defendant took the
stand in his own behalf,83 (2) allowing impeachment only if the
conviction were for a crime crimen falsi in nature, 4 (3) restricting
the introduction of impeachment evidence to cases where the defen-
dant introduced evidence of his character for truthfulness and thus
limiting impeachment by prior conviction to rebuttals,85 (4) giving
the judge full discretion to admit or exclude convictions, allowing
maximum flexibility, 8 and (5) excluding evidence of a prior convic-
tion only if similar to the crime with which the defendant was
charged.
In failing to adopt any changes to the common law rule, the Advi-
81. The draft read:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a crime is admissible but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or
(2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment.
PRELIMINARY DRAFr oF PROPosED RuLEs or EVIDENCE, RULE 609(a) (1969), reprinted in 46
F.R.D. 161, 295-96 (1969).
The Advisory Committee's note explained that the draft paralleled the most common of
the state rules and used as its criteria for admissibility common law grounds of disqualifica-
tion. The Committee decided to accept this draft because it believed a demonstrated willing-
ness to engage in conduct in disregard of accepted social patterns indicated a willingness to
give false testimony. Id. at 296-97.
82. Id.
83. The committee was concerned that disallowing evidence of all prior convictions might
enable the accused to appear more credible than he in fact is. At least some crimes are
relevant to the issue of credibility. Id. at 298 (Advisory Committee Notes).
84. Conviction for any of several crimes not involving dishonesty is, nonetheless, relevant
to credibility. Id. at 298-99.
85. The problem with this approach -is that it affords only superficial protection to the
accused. By introducing witnesses who will testify to the defendant's dishonest character, a
prosecutor offers the accused a Hobson's choice: he can allow the testimony to go unchal-
lenged or he can introduce his own character witnesses who, during cross-examination, may
be asked if they have heard that the defendant committed the relevant prior crimes. Id. at
299.
86. Guides for exercising this discretion are practically impossible to develop. Id.
87. The committee felt that under this approach, admission of prior convictions would
become a matter of random chance. Id.
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sory Committee was criticized by judges and practitioners for not
effectively dealing with the competing interests of prejudice and
probative value."' To meet the demand for innovation, the rule was
revised." In its unpublished version, the revised rule gave the trial
judge discretion to exclude evidence of a felony if he believed that
the prior conviction would not be useful in the jury's assessment of
the witness' credibility." The Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure struck the wording which gave open discretion to the trial
judge and substituted a clause that specifically required judges to
weigh the probative value of all prior convictions against the danger
of unfair prejudice.' With this added clause, the section met with
considerable resistance in Congress, because it incorporated the
Luck rule,9" which Congress had-previously rejected93 in formulating
88. See Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: An Introduction and Critque,
38 U. CINN. L. Rav. 449, 473-74 (1969); see also Spector, Impeaching the Defendant By His
Prior Convictions And the Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence: A Half Step Forward and
Three Steps Backward, 1 Loy. U.L.J. 247 (1970).
89. The revised draft read:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a crime is admissible but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted
unless the judge finds that the conviction is lacking in probative value on the issue of
credibility, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment.
3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 609[01], at 609-48 (1976) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter cited as WE.NSTEN].
90. Id.
91. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has
been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo contendre, is admissible but only
if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement
regardless of the punishment, unless (3) in either case, the judge determines that the
probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice.
REvISED DRAFT OF PRoPosED RuLES OF EvmEcE, RULE 609(a) (1971), reprinted in 51 F.R.D.
315, 391 (1971). The Advisory Committee intended to leave room for sound judicial discretion
and admitted that the rule had its genesis in Luck. Id. at 393 (Advisory Committee Notes).
92. See WEINsTEIN, supra note 89, 609[01] at 609-49 (1976).
93. See Crime in the National Capital, Part 4, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
District of Columbia, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1396-97 (1969), reprinted in WEINSTEIN, supra note
89, $ 609101] at 609-49 to -53 (1976). Congress' decision to reject the Luck rule was at least
partially influenced by the Department of Justice. In July, 1969, the Department submitted
legislation overruling Luck, explaining that proof of a conviction is the best probative evi-
dence of a willingness to engage in conduct which injures the rights of others. Id.
Congress also noted that the Bar Association of the District of Columbia supported the
elimination of the Luck rule and that the rule was inconsistent with the law in almost 90%
of the states. Id.
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the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act
of 1970.11 In that act, Congress mandated the admission of prior
convictions of felonies and crimes involving dishonesty, thus return-
ing to a more traditional impeachment code as adopted by the
United States Supreme Court. 5
Swayed by adverse congressional reaction to the added clause, the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure remodeled its pro-
posed rule after the District of Columbia Act of 1970. The Supreme
Court of the United States adopted this draft"6 and submitted it to
the House of Representatives for consideration. In the House, a
subcommittee amended the rule by permitting the trial court to
balance the danger of prejudice against the probative value before
admitting the prior conviction. 7 The House Judiciary Committee
further amended this draft, possibly because of the Luck influence,
and limited admissibility to crimes involving dishonesty or false
statement." The Judiciary Committee's primary concern was that
the traditional rule, which admitted all felonies, discouraged defen-
dants with criminal records from testifying." After a long debate,' 0
94. D.C. Code § 14-305 (b)(1) (1973).
95. The Act reads in perteninent part:
[Flor the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness
has been convicted of a criminal offense shall be admitted . . . but only if the criminal
offense (A) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted, or (B) involved dishonesty or false statement
(regardless of the punishment).
Id.
96. The recommendation stated: "In light of the fact that Congress specifically rejected
the Luck rule . . . it is recommended that the Committee . . .not incorporate the Luck rule
into Rule 609. . . .[I]t is recommended that the Committee adopt the rule enacted by
Congress for [the District of Columbia]." REPORT OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 45-49 (1971),
reprinted in WEINSTEIN, supra note 89, 609[01] at 609-49 to -53 (1975). This proposed draft
provided:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a crime is admissible but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted or
(2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment.
RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS, RULE 609(a), reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 269
(1973).
97. The Subcommittee addition read: "[Unless the court determines that the danger
of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence of the conviction.
H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973).
98. The amended version read: "(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credi-
bility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible only if the
crime involved dishonesty or false statement." Id.
99. Id.
100. See 120 CONG. REC. 1407-22, 2366-94 (1974). Representative Hogan stated that the
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the House of Representatives passed the rule as recommended by
the House Judiciary Committee.
In the Senate, rule 609 continued to raise controversy, 01 but for
the first time, different treatment for defendants and other wit-
nesses was proposed.' 2 The Senate Judiciary Committee members
reasoned that the danger of prejudice was much greater when the
defendant took the stand, since prior convictions could be used as
evidence of guilt as well as of lack of credibility. With respect to the
defendant, the committee agreed with the House: only evidence of
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement should be admit-
ted.' 3 The committee proposed that for purposes of impeaching a
witness other than the defendant, evidence of any felony could be
used in addition to crimes involving dishonesty, if the court found
that the probative value as to credibility outweighed the evidence's
prejudicial effect on the witness.'04 Although the rule appeared equi-
table, the proposal did little to ease Congressional doubts about the
inadequacies of a discretionary standard. Senator McClellan offered
a draft that restored the rule to the original version adopted by the
Supreme Court"'5 with some clarifying language. 06 After suffering a
defeat by a tie vote, this proposal passed the Senate on a motion to
rule adopted the worst feature of Luck-unpredictability. By allowing only evidence of crimen
falsi crimes to impeach the credibility of the accused, the rule gave the courts broad discretion
to determine what crimes are admissible, without useful criteria by which to exercise it. Thus,
adoption of the rule would have resulted in uneven treatment of defendants. Id. at 1414.
Representative Dennis believed discretionary freedom was the best choice because it
shielded the defendant from the harshness of the traditional rule which allowed admission of
all felonies. Under the traditional rule, the defendant either had to remain silent or take the
stand and have the convictions introduced. Whatever the defendant's choice, the potential
for prejudice would be overwhelming. Dennis believed the rule limiting convictions to dishon-
esty or false statement was the only way to afford the defendant proper protection. Id. at 1419-
20.
101. See United States v. Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938, 941 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (discussing
legislative history of rule 609(a)). The rule was extensively discussed at Judiciary Committee
hearings on June 4th and 5th, 1974. See Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary on Fed.
Rules of Evidence, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. 12-20, 118, 277-78, 314, 316 (1974).
102. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2nd Seas. 7, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 7051, 7061.
103. The Committee defined dishonesty or false statement as including "perjury or subor-
nation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement or false pretense, or any
offense, in the nature of crimen falsi the commission of which involves some element of
untruthfulness, deceit or falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to testify truth-
fully." Id.
104. Id.
105. See note 96 supra.
106. See 120 CONG. REc. 37075-76 (1974).
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reconsider.'"7 The differences between the House and Senate ver-
sions of rule 609 were finally compromised by the Committee of
Conference which proposed the present rule. 0
C. Application of Rule 609(a)
Rule 609(a) classifies crimes which are admissible for impeach-
ment purposes as: (1) felonies, without regard to the nature of the
crime and (2) crimes involving dishonesty and false statement,
without regard to the grade of the offense.' 9 Within the first cate-
gory, felonies"0 are admissible if the party offering the conviction
can convince the court that knowledge of the crime will aid the jury
in its assessment of the defendant's credibility more than it will
prejudice him."' Crimes within the second category are automati-
cally admissible regardless of the likelihood of prejudice."' As to
these crimes, involving dishonesty or false statement, the court is
no longer free to exercise the discretion it had under Luck. Congress
has substituted its judgment for the discretion of the trial judge by
declaring that evidence of such crimes is always sufficiently relevant
to credibility to warrant admission regardless of possible preju-
dice." 3 Crimes involving dishonesty or false statement have been
held to include perjury, subornation, criminal fraud, embezzlement,
false pretense' 4 or any offense in the nature of crimen falsi. "1
107. See id. at 37083.
108. See CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 7098, 7103. In its report, the Conference Committee explains and justifies
the rule it promulgated.
109. FED. R. Evm. 609(a).
110. To evaluate the severity of the crime involved, the court should refer to the congres-
sional, measure of a felony rather than to individual state standards. Under federal law, any
offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year is a felony. See
18 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 544 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1977) (prior conviction
cannot be admitted without court determination that the probative value substantially out-
weighs the prejudicial effect).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1976) (prior conviction
automatically admissible because it involved dishonesty); United States v. Dixon, 547 F.2d
1079 (9th Cir. 1976) (crime automatically admissible if it involves dishonesty or false state-
ment).
113. See CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 7098, 7103. See also United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United
States v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
114. See United States v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v.
Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
115. See United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1326 (9th Cir. 1976).
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Since crimes within the second category of rule 609(a) are auto-
matically admissible- for impeachment purposes, no burden of proof
questions are raised. The only possible limitation on the admission
of crimes involving dishonesty and false statement is Rule 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence."' Rule 403 allows the trial judge to ex-
clude evidence, although relevant, if its probative value is out-
weighed by the danger of prejudice, confusion of the issues, mislead-
ing the jury, or Undue delay. 17 During the hearings on rule 609(a)
in the House of Representatives, it was noted that rule 403 might
serve to effectively nullify the automatic admissibility prescribed
under rule 609(a)(2) for crimes involving dishonesty or false state-
ment.I 8 To date, however, rule 403 has not been applied to limit rule
609(a)(2), and it probably will not be so used. Congress explicitly
rejected judicial balancing when the prior conviction was for a crime
involving dishonesty, and the courts should not invoke a general
statutory provision, rule 403, to modify a specific provision, rule
609(a).
When the attempt is to impeach by introducing evidence of a
felony conviction for a crime not involving dishonesty, the burden
of proving that the evidence should be admitted falls upon the offer-
ing party."9 This is. a major change from the rule established in
Luck 20 where the defendant was forced to prove that a prior convic-
tion should be excluded. Rule 609(a) shifts the burden to the prose-
cution in most cases by making admissibility the exception rather
than the rule. 12' A prior felony is not admissible unless its probative
116. See United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 358 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
117. FED. R. EVID. 403 states: "[RIelevant ... evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presen-
tation of cumulative evidence."
118. See Hearings on S. 583, H.R. 4958 and H.R. 5463 Before the Special Subcomm. on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d. Cong., 1st Sess.,
251-52 (1973) (Judge Friendly remarking that rule 403 might be used to exclude evidence
automatically admissible under rule 609(a)(2)).
119. See United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 359-60 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (rule 609(a) shows
an intent to place the burden of proof on the party seeking admission of the felony).
120. 348 F.2d 763, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
121. The Luck test was structured to force the defendant to meet the burden; he had to
prove to the court that the prejudicial effect of the proposed impeachment far outweighed
its probative value. Id. Rule 609(a) changed the standard by placing the burden on the
prosecuting attorney who now must prove that the probative value of the evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect as to the defendant.
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value outweighs its prejudicial effect.' 2 By placing the burden on
the prosecution, rule 609(a) helps to assure the defendant that a
prior felony will not be admitted if it is being used as substantive
evidence of his guilt.
Another innovation introduced by rule 609(a) is the establish-
ment of a separate standard to govern the admissibility of a defen-
dant's prior convictions. If the felony conviction is other than for a
crime involving dishonesty, the court must determine that the pro-
bative value of the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect, but
only with respect to the defendant.'3 Congress considered and re-
jected the possibility of prejudicing a witness other than the defen-
dant.2 4 It felt the danger of prejudice to others 5 is outweighed by
the jury's need for as much relevant evidence as possible on the issue
of credibility. 6
Obviously, the discretionary standard is applicable to a criminal
accused who takes the stand; but conceivably, a civil defendant has
the same protection.2 7 In formulating what is now rule 609(a), the
Conference Committee did not use the term "accused" as the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee had done, and rule 609(a) therefore liter-
ally encompasses civil defendants. It is clear from a reading of the
Conference Committee Report, however, that the Committee in-
tended to protect only the rights of an accused in criminal proceed-
ings. "'28 Even assuming that rule 609(a) is broadly interpreted, the
prejudicial effect on a civil defendant of introducing his prior con-
viction can not be equated with the damaging impact of introducing
122. See FED. R. Evw. 609(a)(1). See also United States v. McMillian, 535 F.2d 1035 (8th
Cir. 1976) (conviction admissible if probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect); United
States v. Pratt, 531 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1976) (prior felony conviction is admissible if probative
value is greater than potential prejudice).
123. FED. R. Evm. 609 (a)(1).
124. See CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 7098, 7103. For cases interpreting this phrase, see United States v. Thorne, 547
F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976) (prejudicial effect considered is only that which may affect the
defendant); United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (only consider affect on
defendant).
125. A witness other than the defendant is damaged by the introduction of prior crimes
to impeach him to the extent his reputation in the community is injured.
126. See CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 7098, 7103.
127. See Savikas, New Concepts in Impeachment: Rule 609(a), Federal Rules of
Evidence, 57 CI. B. REc. 76, 79 (1975).
128. See CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 7098, 7103.
Vol. 16: 73
Comment
an accused's criminal record; the conviction will probably be admit-
ted on the basis that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial
effect.
Consideration must also be given to the extent to which rule
609(a) restricts the impeachment by prior conviction of defense wit-
nesses other than the defendant, since such impeachment may also
have a "prejudicial effect to the defendant."'' 9 The danger of preju-
dice to the defendant's case, however, is much less severe where
such witnesses are impeached, and the jury's need for evidence re-
lating to the witnesses' credibility will in most cases warrant admis-
sion. If the same standard of admissibility were applied to both the
prior crimes of the defendant and those of his witnesses, an unjusti-
fiable imbalance might be created between the apparent credibility
of the prosecutor's and the defendant's witnesses.'30 Prior felony
convictions of a witness other than the defendant should be ex-
cluded, therefore, only when they present a danger of improperly
influencing the outcome of the trial by persuading the jury to con-
vict the .defendant on the basis of another's prior record.' 3' Since
impeachment of a prosecution witness will rarely prejudice the de-
fendant, the only practical limitation on impeachment of a govern-
ment witness through a prior crime is Rule 611(a)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence3 2 which protects all witnesses from harassment
or undue embarrassment.' 3
Although rule 609(a) has not been in effect long enough to accur-
ately analyze its success, the rule should aid the defendant far more
than did the Luck decision. As noted, defense counsel may cross-
examine a prosecution witness about all prior felony convictions, as
well as crimes involving dishonesty or false statement because the
inquiry will not prejudice the defendant,' 34 while the prosecution
129. In presenting the conference report to the House, Representative Hungate noted that
impeachment of a defense witness by prior conviction may always have a prejudicial effect
on the defendant. See 120 CONG. REc. 40891 (1974).
130. See Curran, Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a), 49 TEsp. L.Q. 890, 895 (1976).
131. For example, exclusion of the conviction may be proper where the only defense
witness is a relative or close friend of the defendant and the possibility exists that the jury
might associate the prior criminal record of the witness with the defendant.
132. FED. R. EvID. 611(a) states: "The court shall exercise reasonable control over the
mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to . . (3) protect
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."
133. See United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 359 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (discussing
possibility of using rule 611 (a)(3) to limit rule 609(a)).
134. For an explanation of the ways in which rule 609(a) changes the traditional rule, see
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may be limited in what it may ask the defense witnesses. Further-
more, the government has the burden of proving the substantial
probative value of introducing the prior felony convictions of the
defendant. 35
IV. RELATIVE VALUE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA AND FEDERAL RULES
The Pennsylvania rule does not balance the need for evidence
against the potential for prejudice as well as Rule 609(a) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Not only does the federal rule protect the
defendant by screening those felonies that may unduly prejudice
him, it assures the jury that they will know of the crimes bearing
directly on the witness' credibility by automatically admitting
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement.
The premise of the Pennsylvania rule, which admits only convic-
tions involving dishonesty or false statement, is that those crimes
are relevant to credibility and all others unduly prejudice the defen-
dant.'36 If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided that crimes
involving dishonesty or false statement bear directly on veracity,
why give the trial court such broad discretion to exclude them? It
would seem that they should be admitted as an acceptable compro-
mise between the dual considerations of prejudice and probative
value. In assessing the credibility of a witness, the jury is trying to
decide whether he is telling the truth; a conviction for a crime in-
volving dishonesty is virtually always a good indicator. Both the
Pennsylvania and federal rules share a problem in this regard in
that "dishonesty" is not easily defined by a trial court. But once the
decision is made that the crime does involve dishonesty, the federal
rule does not burden the court with further considerations. Pennsyl-
vania courts, on the other hand, require that the trial court continue
to examine the conviction using the vague criteria of Luck. If a
crime is one of dishonesty the jury should be apprised of the convic-
tion in every case.
The factors a Pennsylvania trial judge must consider, as adopted
from United States v. Luck,'37 cannot materially aid his decision;
120 CONG. REc. 40891 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dennis).
135. See notes 119-121 and accompanying text supra.
136. See Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d 255 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Moore, 369 A.2d 862 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
137. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Vol. 16: 73
Comment
they are labels without substance. Aside from the difficulty in defin-
ing dishonesty," 8 a judge must determine when a conviction is re-
mote. 139 The federal rule has established a ten year limit on admissi-
bility of prior crimes."" Rather than adopt the ten year federal limit,
a Pennsylvania judge can arbitrarily decide whether or not a prior
conviction is too remote and admit or exclude on that basis. A
definite time limit should be established.
Considerations such as the probable impact of the witness' testi-
mony and the need for the defendant's testimony' also appear to
be valid criteria, but as they are so difficult to apply, they are of
little use to a trial judge. To properly administer these criteria, the
judge must predict the course of the trial in a pretrial conference,
yet such variables as the strength or weakness of material witnesses
and the effectiveness of trial tactics - considerations necessary to
the judge's determination - are almost impossible to accurately
forecast.
The federal rule not only requires the admission of crimes involv-
ing dishonesty or false statement,' it also provides for admission
of other relevant felony convictions barred by the Pennsylvania
rule.4 3 For example, a rule of thumb provides that crimes of violence
do not involve dishonesty.' Following this guideline, a Pennsyl-
vania judge could not admit a witness' prior conviction for murder
in the first degree. Should a convicted murderer be deemed as credi-
ble as a witness with an unblemished record? Admittedly, commis-
sion of the crime does not involve dishonesty; nevertheless, it re-
138. The real difficulty comes when considering different gradations of the same offense.
For example, a judge would probably decide that car theft involves dishonesty. Does joyriding
involve the same degree of dishonesty or dishonesty at all?
139. See Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 566-67, 307 A.2d 255, 262-63 (1973)
(adopted the criteria set forth in United States v. Luck, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
140. FED. R. EVID. 609(b) states: "Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissi-
ble if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the
release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later
date. .... "
141. See Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 566-67, 307 A.2d 255, 262-263 (1973)
(adopted the criteria set forth in Luck).
142. FED. R. Evm. 609(a)(2). See also United States v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (admissibility of crimes involving dishonesty or false statement not within the discre-
tion of the judge).
143. FED. R. EvID. 609(a)(1).
144. See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1029 (1968).
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flects a character of such moral depravity that dishonesty can be
anticipated.
The federal rule opens the possibility of admitting not only mur-
der, but crimes such as kidnapping and air piracy, which arguably
do not involve dishonesty per se but would seem to be of value in a
juror's assessment of a witness' credibility.' This approach is more
rational than automatic exclusion of all crimes that do not involve
dishonesty or false statement.
The burden of proof adopted by Congress in rule 609(a) also dem-
onstrates the superiority of the federal rule. By forcing the govern-
ment to prove that a conviction relates to veracity,' rule 609(a)
would seem to render obsolete the fears of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court that the defendant will be unduly prejudiced if evi-
dence of convictions for crimes not involving dishonesty are admissi-
ble. If the government cannot prove that the crime will help the jury
to assess the defendant's credibility more than it will prejudice him,
it will not be admitted. Federal rule 609(a) is rigid enough to make
its application simple, yet flexible enough to provide the jury with
as much information relevant to credibility as possible. Further-
more, its structure offers maximum protection to the defendant
while not ignoring the need for relevant evidence. Rule 609 has
achieved an effective compromise between these competing inter-
ests and Pennsylvania courts would be wise to adopt it.
THOMAS J. SANTONE
145. See FED. R. EviD. 609(a)(1). See also United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (if the probative value of prior conviction outweighs the prejudicial effect to the defen-
dant it is admissible regardless of the nature of the conviction).
146. See FED. R. EvlD. 609(a)(1). See also United States v. Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.
1976).
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